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For corporations earning less than $25,000, 122% of the first
$5,000, 14% of the next $15,000, 16% of the last $5,000;
Corporations earning slightly over $25,000 will pay, first, 18%
of their normal tax net income, or, second, $3,525, plus 32% of the
amount of the normal tax net income in excess of $25,000, whichever
is less. The $3,525 figure is the full tax for corporations earning
$25,000 under the above schedule.

9. Individual Tax Rates. No change.
10. Stamp Tax. The 1939 Act permits transfer of
stock by an executor or administrator without stamp taxes, if
the value of the shares is not greater than the amount of the
tax that otherwise would be imposed.

AUGMENTING THE ANOMALOUSNESS OF THE
ANOMALOUS INDORSER
By R. HICKMAN WALKER, of the Denver Bar
HIS relates to Winton vs. Sullivan, 104 Colo. 450, decided June 12, 1939. En Banc. No dissent. Mr. Justice Francis E. Bouck not participating. Opinion by
Mr. Justice Bock.
The writer hereof would not have been bothered by
Winton vs. Sullivan if it were not for the fact, intrinsically
unimportant, that during a period of years he personally conducted annual excursions at a nearby university into the alien
scenery of the Law Merchant. Among the curiosities rather
closely examined on these explorations was the Anomalous
Indorser. This was the accommodating person who, prior to
the delivery of a negotiable instrument, wrote his name upon
the back thereof for the purpose of lending credit to the maker
or payee and without sustaining any other relation to the instrument. Before the adoption of N. I. L. (a symbol, perhaps, also of what is generally known about it) there was no
uniformity in the views of the courts of the United States as
to the nature of the contract of the anomalous indorser. Some
courts held that his contract was that of an indorser; others
that his contract was that of a maker (in the case of a note) ;
and still others that his contract was to be established by parol
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evidence. Colorado'held to the second of these views. Good
vs. Martin, 1 Colo. 165; Kiskadden vs. Allen, 7 Colo. 206;
Tabor vs. Miles, 5 Colo. App. 127; Byers vs. Tritch, 12 Colo.
App. 377; Edmonston vs. Ascough, 43 Colo. 55.
Among the purposes (as it is alleged) of the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law was the removal of the conflict
in authority above noted. 10 C. J. S. 468. The section
designed for this purpose is found as Section 64, Chapter 112,
'35 C. S. A., reading in part as follows:
"Where a person, not otherwise a party to an instrument, places
thereon his signature in blank before delivery, he is liable as indorser in
accordance with the following rules:
"First-If the instrument is payable to the order of a third person,
he is liable to the payee and to all subsequent parties."

To take a bond of fate upon this particular question and
also to cover other similar situations, Section 63, Id., reads:
"A person placing his signature upon an instrument otherwise
than as maker, drawer or acceptor is deemed to be an indorser unless he
clearly indicates by appropriate words his intention to be bound in some
other capacity."

In Edmonston vs. Ascough, supra, Edmonston signed on
the face of the note below the maker's signature, adding the
word "surety" and so the court said:
"We do not consider what the effect would have been under our

negotiable instrument law had Edmonston's name been indorsed in
blank on the back of the instrument. Prior to the adoption of that law
this would have made no difference; he would, even had he signed solely
for the accommodation of Dustin, have been regarded as a joint maker."

In this state of the law, and probably ignorant of it, the
aforesaid Sullivan, prior to the delivery of a note to the payee,
indorsed it as follows: "Demand, notice and protest waived.
Payment guaranteed. E.J.Sullivan." Thereafter the holder
accepted from a person claiming to be the trustee for the creditors of the maker twenty per cent of the amount due "in full
satisfaction of all indebtedness to the payee" from the maker.
However, the holder credited upon the note only the amount
so received, and afterwards transferred it to the plaintiff Winton. Sullivan contended that he was discharged from liability
under the note by the following provision of the Act (Section
120, Chapter 112, C. S. A.):
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"A person secondarily liable on the instrument is discharged: * * *
"Fifth-By a release of the principal debtor unless the holder's
right of recourse against the party secondarily liable is expressly reserved."

Apparently he also contended that he was to be deemed
a mere guarantor and not an indorser, and therefore released
by the settlement made between the holder and the maker.
As its first task the opinion addressed itself to the proposition that notwithstanding the phrase "payment guaranteed," the writing on the back of the note was a commercial
indorsement and Sullivan an indorser. This task the opinion
performed with vigor and considerable success, and with an
imposing show of authorities. Up to this point the mind
perusing the opinion feels no particular strain, and looks confidently ahead to an early and easy solution of the problem.
For if, as the court has thus established, Sullivan's contract
was not merely a guaranty, then there stands Section 64 precisely prepared to take care of the situation and to say what
Sullivan's liability is, namely, that "he is liable as indorser"
to the payee and to all subsequent parties. The court, however, finds it unnecessary or deems it unworthy to invoke such
obvious support for its conclusion that Sullivan is indorser,
and this perhaps is not important except to sensitive friends
of Section 64. What is important is that Sullivan, at pages
454 and 455 of the opinion, is given such assurance that he
occupies the position of indorser that it would seem he could
relax and enjoy the remainder of the opinion. For, being an
indorser, his first and excusable impression is that he is a party
"secondarily liable" (as indorsers typically are) and therefore
released in accordance with the terms of Section 120, supra.
His security, however, is both false and transient, for the court
makes an indorser out of him in order to destroy him, and this
it does by the disconcerting announcement of a general rule to
the effect that an accommodation party is primarily liable.
The Negotiable Instrument Act itself has its own notion of
what constitutes primary liability, since it says: "The person
primarily liable on an instrument is the person who by the
terms of the instrument is absolutely required to pay the same.
All other parties are secondarily liable." The Act therefore
distinguishes primary from secondary liability by the terms of
the contract. The court appears to ground its distinction upon
the presence or absence of consideration given for the contract.
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In other words, under the rule of Winton vs. Sullivan, one
who writes his name upon the back of a note to accommodate
his friend, the maker, becomes primarily liable, but one who
demands twenty-five dollars for the same service is only secondarily liable. The only decision cited in support of this
distinction is Hall vs. Farmers Bank, 74 Colo. 165, in which
case it was held that one who signed as a maker for the accommodation of the co-maker was primarily liable and that the
rules of suretyship were not applicable to such a situation.
That holding, of course, was inevitable since the accommodating contract by its terms was a primary contract, namely, that
of a maker. Under Winton vs. Sullivan, however, if you
wish to be safe, you have to be mercenary. If you wish to preserve the rights of an indorser, you have to charge for your
indorsement.
It might have been a pretty question in Winton vs. Sullivan whether the waiver of demand, notice and protest contained in the indorsement did not have the effect of making the
indorser's liability primary. There are some courts that have
said that it would, but others have held to the contrary, and
it does seem as if an indorser could waive demand, notice and
protest without also waiving the right which an indorser has
to have the contract between the maker and the holder kept
intact as against the maker. We do not, however, find in Winton vs. Sullivan any airing of this question. It is true the
opinion says as a preface to the discussion of the question of
guarantor or indorser, that there is no contention nor any facts
to support one if made "that the indorsement on the note
signed by defendant is a collateral contract or undertaking and
not a direct liability." This seems at best but a remote allusion
to the effect of the waiver in Sullivan's indorsement, and other
portions of the opinion seem to indicate that this waiver was
playing no part in the reasoning of the court, but that the
simple ratio decidendi is that any accommodation party is primarily liable.
If this be the correct interpretation of the opinion, then
Winton vs. Sullivan must be deemed a "re-examination" of a
fundamental rule of commercial law and to constitute a
"shift" in doctrine. It will be interesting to observe what the
annotators do with Winton vs. Sullivan.

